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Impressions of Orthodoxy in Turkey:
Secularization, Politics, Arts,
and Tourism
Gitta Hammarberg

S

ince 1991, His All Holiness Bartholomew I, Archbishop of Constantinople, New Rome and Ecumenical Patriarch, the 270th successor
to Christ’s apostle St. Andrew, presides over the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople. The Patriarchate has existed uninterruptedly
since the fourth century A.D., even when Byzantine Constantinople
fell to the Muslim Turks in 1453. It has been a “church in captivity”
for over 500 years, continuing even today in a secular Turkish state.
The Patriarch leads over 300 million Orthodox Christians, the world’s
oldest and second largest Christian community.1 The Muslim majority religion, approximately 99% of the population, is overseen by the
government’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). The non-Muslim religions, including about seventy Greek Orthodox sites (with a
dwindling population variously estimated at 2000–5000 members) and
around fifty Armenian Orthodox sites (with 65,000 members) are regulated by a different government agency, the General Directorate for
Foundations (Vakiflar Genel Mudurlugu). The Orthodox sites, together
with circa twenty Jewish sites (with 25,000 members), have special
legal minority status, as dictated by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty.2 As Ecumenical, the Patriarch is recognized by autocephalous and autonomous
Orthodox churches internationally as the primus inter pares of bishops.
The Turkish government, however, does not formally recognize the
ecumenical authority of the Patriarch, only his authority over the country’s Greek Orthodox community. What Steven Runciman said in 1971
about Patriarch Athenagoras (1948–72) holds equally true of the pres-
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ent Patriarch: his relations with the Turkish secular state are “delicate
and difficult” and the Turkish government “would prefer him not to
be there at all.”3
Though the Turkish constitution mandates freedom of religion and
the government in recent years has shown some tolerance of religion,
there are nevertheless undue restrictions on religious groups and
expression. The government regulates church property, it can close
religious seminaries, grant cultural heritage status to sacred sites, prohibit the building of places of worship, and so on. To a non-expert
observer, the boundaries between religious and secular life in Turkey
seem fluid. The Patriarch’s status as religious leader seems ambiguous,
and his religious functions seem to blend seamlessly into more secular
ones. Though the ecumenical status of Patriarch Bartholomew is not
officially recognized, there seems, however, to be a tacit recognition of
this status, which, for instance, allows him to travel widely and perform ecumenical activities.4
Patriarch Bartholomew has been particularly active in ecumenical
outreach. He has promoted peace and interfaith cooperation, served
as president of the World Council of Churches, and joined Pope John
Paul II in attempts to reconcile the Orthodox and Catholic churches.
He has met with the World Jewish Congress, traveled extensively in
Muslim countries, and visited Georgia and Armenia. His trip to Cuba
in 2004 was the first visit by an Ecumenical Patriarch to Latin America.
He has also organized interfaith conferences and addressed environmental issues in the Black Sea, the Danube basin, the Adriatic and
Baltic Seas—a special interest that has made him known as the “Green
Patriarch” and garnered him awards such as Norway’s Sophie Prize
for linking faith to environmental issues.5 In addition, Patriarch Bartholomew promotes Byzantine culture. He is, for instance, one of the
primary supporters of Byzantine art exhibitions held at the Metropolitan Museum in New York, including the current “Byzantium: Faith
and Power (1261–1557).” His “Statement” in Greek and English opens
the magnificent exhibition catalogue. He visited the exhibition and
gave a lecture, “Byzantine Icons: A Legacy of Humanism,” on March
18, 2004.6 His “religious” leadership thus includes “secular” environmental and artistic issues.
Patriarch Bartholomew’s local authority as Archbishop of Constantinople, recognized by the government, extends most directly over
small Greek Orthodox communities in Turkey as well as some communities in the Greek islands and Northern Greece—modest remains
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of a once glorious Byzantine empire. Minority religions have not had
an easy time in an overwhelmingly Muslim and now secular state.
The list of human rights violations is long and includes acts of ethnic
cleansing, pogroms, forced expulsions, acts of terrorism, vandalism,
and even restrictions on the theological functioning of the Orthodox
church.7 The size of the Orthodox community in today’s Turkey is
negligible: “The Greek community in Turkey is dwindling, elderly
and frightened. Its population has declined from about 110,000 at the
time of the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 to about 2,500 today
[1991].”8 Documenting the state of the Greek congregations in Istanbul,
Anastasia Stanmeyer cites George Jahos, a caretaker at a small church
in downtown Istanbul: only nine people attend Sunday services. Jahos
feels that Orthodox congregations in Turkey “are finished.” My own
visit to several Greek Orthodox churches in the vicinity of the Patriarchate in June 2004 (in the company of a Turkish-speaking Macalester
College student, Basak Candar) bore out this pessimistic view. We
visited the 13th-century Church of St. Mary of the Mongols, which,
according to the Eyewitness Travel Guide to Istanbul, “is the only Greek
Orthodox church in Istanbul to have remained continuously in the
hands of the Greek community since the Byzantine era.” It was never
converted to a mosque nor put to other uses and still contains a rich
array of ancient icons and an especially beautiful Byzantine mosaic of
the Theotokos Pammakristos.9 The caretaker told us that services are
held only once a month and that no more than fifteen persons on the
average attend, all of them elderly. According to Douglas Frantz, “the
population of ethnic Greeks, with an average age of sixty, has been
whittled from 15,000 to about 2,500 over a century of expulsions, attrition and migration.”10 This situation threatens the continued operation of the church and many churches have reverted to the state when
the community has decreased to less than ten people. An Armenian
Orthodox church in Kirikhan, Hatay province, for instance, had to be
turned over to an Armenian Orthodox Church Board after a complex
court case.11 The Orthodox sites of worship are not only endangered in
a spiritual sense, but also badly in need of upkeep and staffing. Andre
Gerolymatos, assessing the year 2003–04, accuses the Turkish state of
wishing to eliminate all traces of Byzantium:
Churches, monasteries, neo-classical houses and public buildings that
represented the Greeks and hence Turkey’s European heritage has [sic]
been destroyed or simply allowed to decay. Even Saint Sophia, one of
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the greatest Churches and architectural monuments of the Greco-Roman
period has languished as a museum relic rather than be permitted to
function as a church. Why? The inescapable conclusion is that any reference to Hellenic civilization or Christianity is offensive to the Turkish
state. Otherwise the Ecumenical Patriarchate would not need to secure
an official permit in order to paint a wall or fix a church bell.12

Even at the Patriarchate itself, the 18th-century Church of St. George
was open during our visit, but no guide was available at midday on a
Saturday, despite the published 9:00–5:00 “daily” schedule. Two caretakers were in the process of dusting the church and allowed us to look
at the rich icons, the Byzantine-era Patriarch’s throne, an ornate iconostasis, and other unique treasures housed there. The Church of the
Pammakaristos housed the Patriarchate from the time of the Ottoman
conquest until it was converted into a mosque in the 16th century. A
side chapel with Byzantine mosaics operates as a museum and is supposedly open during prayer hours. We gained access into the courtyard with the help of neighborhood children, which at least gave us
a glimpse of the outside of the church and the remnants of Byzantine
marble friezes displayed on the lawn. Other churches are also accessible only by ringing the doorbell on the gate to alert the caretakers,
which is not always successful. We managed to rouse the caretaker of
another small Church of St. George in the neighborhood, but it was
clear that visitors were hardly expected and that services were held
sporadically at best. Although this church, too, contains ancient icons
(especially fine ones of its patron saint), the caretaker could offer us
no relevant information and we were struck by the incongruously
garish blue paint that had recently been applied to the interior walls.13
The 12th-century Church of the Pantocrator, now a mosque, was similarly desolate. Despite being featured prominently in guidebooks and
advertised as potentially accessible outside prayer hours, we had no
luck. All these churches are located in the vicinity of the current Patriarchate, a once thriving Greek and Jewish community, now in urgent
need of urban renewal. The Jews and Greeks have apparently been
succeeded by extremist Islamists, judging by the profusion of their
election posters and banners as well as covered women, including very
young girls. The locals had no knowledge of the Orthodox churches.
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*****
Part of the reason for the difficulty in sustaining Turkish Orthodox
congregations is the scarcity of trained clergy, especially acute after the
closing of both Greek and Armenian theological seminaries in 1971,
when the state nationalized private institutions of higher learning. The
figures for Armenian Orthodox priests are indicative: 43 churches and
16 communities without a church are served by a total of 18 ordained
priests. Forty to fifty additional priests are sorely needed.14 According
to Frantz, “fewer than half of Turkey’s Greek Orthodox churches are
open, in part because of a shortage of priests.”15 Patriarch Bartholomew
has energetically tried to convince the government that the Halki seminary, founded in 1844, with room for 80–120 seminarians, should be
reopened. After an intense international campaign and after the Patriarch’s meetings with Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in August 2003, the prospects for reopening
finally seem quite good. “The ruling Justice and Development Party
(AKP) appears to be looking favorably upon the request,” according to
the Patriarch, and “we are waiting with certainty. A political solution to
this is very simple, and it should come very soon.”16 The Patriarch has
expressed openness to “reasonable government controls.” In an interview with George Gilson, the Patriarch states:
We want the school to operate again as it did until 1971. Since it will
operate on Turkish soil, there will be some supervision from the [Turkish] education ministry. This does not disturb us in the least, because we
have nothing to hide. The school used to be run in a manner that was
transparent, far from politics and under the umbrella, protection and
financial support of the Ecumenical Patriarchate…Turkey will benefit
from the reopening of such a school, because it will demonstrate to the
whole world that there is indeed freedom of religion. It will show that
minority rights are respected.17

The opening of the seminary has become a political football between
Turkey and Greece on questions of expanding minority rights on both
sides. This could help the Patriarch’s cause. One of the several petitions for reopening the seminary, for example, notes that, “in 1937,
the mayor of Thessaloniki, Greece, donated the house that Mustapha
Kemal was born in to the Turkish government. The Turkish government should make a similar gesture and should allow the Theological School of Halki to open.”18 Turkey’s bid for European Union (EU)
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membership will no doubt support the seminary opening, as the Patriarch himself likes to stress. Gerylomatos argues convincingly that Turkey could have a “magnificent historical and cultural mechanism” for
claiming “Europeanness” and thus strengthen its case for EU inclusion. It would only have to claim its status as the inheritor of Byzantine
culture, allow the Orthodox church to flourish freely and support the
Ecumenical Patriarchate, allow Hagia Sophia to function as a church,
remove its forces from Cyprus, and negotiate a compromise of the fate
of the Turkish Cypriots.19 The Turkish Daily News of June 8, 2004 cites
an NTV report on Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to Greece in May:
“Authorities have sped up the work to reopen the theological school in
Heybeliada Island off Istanbul and the Foreign ministry has requested
relevant authorities to submit their assessments on the issue.” Erdogan
made the point that the government is considering the issue, though
the Foreign ministry “declined to elaborate.” According to the same
NTV report, “the reopening of the seminary required legal changes
that would allow the seminary to have an independent structure, not
linked to any theological faculty.”20 Religious issues have a way of
entering international politics even in secular states.
Another obstacle to hiring Orthodox priests is that Orthodox clergy
in Turkey are required to hold Turkish citizenship, with a very few
exceptions.21 This has also been addressed by Patriarch Bartholomew,
himself an ethnic Greek with Turkish citizenship. This year he took the
radical step of appointing non-Turkish clerics to half of the twelve seats
on the Holy Synod, the council governing the church, to reflect its ecumenical reach. The appointments include citizens of the United States,
Great Britain, Greece, New Zealand, and Finland. Contradictory statements regarding these appointments, however, provide another reflection of the Patriarchate’s ambivalent relationship to the state. While
a church official maintained that the government had accepted the
Patriarchate’s notification of the appointments, a government official
denied that permission for the Patriarchate to make such appointments
had been granted.22 However, international politics should strengthen
the Patriarchate’s power over religious matters. Foreign support, especially from the American Archdiocese, has been voiced for the appointments, and pressure from the EU also favors the Patriarch’s right to
make such appointments. These concrete examples seem to indicate
that though the local Orthodox communities in Turkey face a precarious diminution, there is some hope for a brighter future. Specifically,
property rights of churches are being addressed, proper training of
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Orthodox priests is likely to improve, and the ecumenical scope of the
Patriarchate is enhanced by an internationalized Holy Synod.
Another aspect of the secularization of Orthodoxy became a point of
contention in connection with Turkey’s plans to commemorate Christianity in the year 2000. Theodore G. Karakostas, for instance, expressed
dismay at the commercial exploitation of Orthodox places of worship
in converting Byzantine churches to mosques and/or museums while
repressing Orthodoxy. “For Turkey to use Christian sites for commercial purposes after eliminating the Christians who once upheld those
sites is IMMORAL and OBSCENE!,” Karakostas exclaims, feeling that
Turkey has no claim to the Byzantine heritage after first destroying
Byzantium and continuing to destroy the last vestiges of Byzantine
culture.23 One can sympathize with these sentiments from a religious
point of view, though one could equally well argue, along with Gerolymatos, that restoring and displaying churches and Byzantine art
for tourists in a secular way is preferable to the ultimate erasure that
otherwise seems inevitable. A functioning Hagia Sophia might, as Gerolymatos puts it, provide a “boost in tourism as millions of Orthodox
Christians would flock to Constantinople.”24 Byzantine culture represents a rich artistic heritage that deserves to be seen, even by nonbelievers. The Patriarch himself, as we have seen, supports artistic
displays of Orthodoxy.
One prime example of “commercialization” is the Church of St. Savior in Chora, included in virtually all city tours of Istanbul and filled
with visitors at all times. This was certainly the case during my two
visits to the church in August 1999 and again in May 2004, when the
church-museum was filled with Orthodox nuns and other believers as
well as non-believers. The ancient monastery complex within which
the current church is situated has undergone numerous changes, due
to earthquakes, crusades, iconoclasts, and the Ottoman conquest of
Constantinople. The church seen today dates from the 11th century,
with significant remodeling and artistic adornment added in the early
14th century. After the Ottoman conquest it was converted to a mosque
without significant architectural changes besides the addition of a
minaret and the whitewashing of the interior art. A good example of
artistic-religious hybridity, it was characteristically referred to as “The
Church Mosque.”25 In 1848–58, it was restored to its present condition by the American Byzantine Institute, and turned into an attractive
museum. The guidebooks today contain obsessively detailed explanations of each fresco and mosaic and their Biblical subtexts—clearly
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directed at tourists entirely unfamiliar with the Bible.26 The careful restoration and conversion to a museum have made this precious example
of Byzantine culture open for all to appreciate.
*****
Though the cycle of conversion, destruction, deterioration, rebuilding,
and redecorating of churches seldom ends up as successfully as in this
church, layers of an interesting hybrid past are characteristic of most
churches in regions settled by successive population waves. One such
region of Turkey is Cappadocia, which is a prime spot for tourism. It
boasts some officially designated “World Heritage Sites” (e.g., Göreme
Open-Air Museum), several museums, and numerous facilities and
festivals for tourists. Its main attractions include amazing volcanic
rock formations, Byzantine churches hewn in rock, and multi-storied
underground cities.27 The Christian heritage of the region is one of its
main attractions, and the Byzantine rock churches are a major part of
any tour, their number estimated at between 400 and 1,000.28 They date
from the 6th through the 12th centuries and, though many structures
and much of the material has been “recycled” by successive populations or destroyed by nature, these churches provide unique evidence
of a flourishing early Christian culture. Cappadocia was a major Christian site and is intimately linked to important figures. For example,
three Orthodox Church fathers lived and worked there: Gregory of
Naziansus, Gregory of Nyssa, and St. Basil the Great. They are amply
featured in tourist brochures. Most of the churches are open to the
public free of charge or at nominal fees. Most of them are also virtually
unprotected and therefore prey to natural disintegration, vandalism,
graffiti, and camera flashes. Only a small portion of them have been
restored (and hence charge entrance fees), especially those located in
open-air museums, such as that in Göreme. Indeed, the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism promotes the Nevsehir region for “Faith
Tourism” and of the 24 sites mentioned on one of its web pages, 20 are
Byzantine churches and monasteries.29
Many of the Cappadocian sites vividly represent religious hybridity. For instance, one of the old cave towns in the Zelve valley features
a church supplied with a rock-carved minaret, still standing close to a
monastery where Christians hid from iconoclastic persecution. Virtually all of its frescoes and walls are covered with centuries of multicultural, multi-religious graffiti. Roadside stands offer tourists the most
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peculiar trinkets, combining religious images and secular elements.
One example is a small wall decoration of a Byzantine iconic cloth representation of the Virgin Eleousa, framed in metalwork incorporating
three “evil eyes.”30 Equally incongruous are glass-enclosed icons containing prayer tokens with money folded to show the face of Ataturk,
found in the small church of St. George in Fener.
Most of the Cappadocian rock churches are small, only partially
preserved, and unsuitable as sites for modern worship. Some churches
are still in use, however. Our visit to Mustafapasa (in Ürgüp town,
Nevsehir province) came just after the Third Sinasos Culture and Art
Festival, celebrated at the end of May. As part of the festival, Patriarch
Bartholomew led a religious service in the Church of Constantine and
Helen, with several other Orthodox prelates present. Flower decorations, quite dried up, still adorned the central pillars during our visit in
June—perhaps an indication that locals want to extend the Patriarch’s
presence. We met a devout Armenian Orthodox believer, Alex Karakulakyan, owner of the Prokopi Restaurant in Ürgüp, who proudly
showed us a photograph in which he stood next to the Patriarch at the
celebration and who himself demonstratively wore a large silver cross.
Prokopi perpetuates Armenian culture in its fabulous menu.
Religious practice in the towns and villages of this region, though
difficult for lack of working churches and clergy, is clearly reinvigorated by visits by Orthodox clergy. The Anadolu News Agency’s
account of the event emphasized the Patriarch’s visit as a cultural mission. It quoted him as saying that he “sincerely believed that Turkey
would join the European Union” and that Turkey already deserves
EU membership “thanks to its cultural heritage and mission.” He also
thanked “Turkish officials for their support to Orthodox people to perform their religious practices in the churches around Anatolia which
had been closed for 80 years.”31 Again, secular concerns seamlessly
blend into religious ones.
To conclude, to an outside observer it seems that the ecumenical
powers of the Patriarch are increasingly recognized by the Turkish
government. Within Turkey, Orthodoxy shows signs of reinvigoration even as its adherents are decreasing in numbers and most of its
churches falling into disrepair and neglect. Paradoxically perhaps, the
Orthodox religion is given a boost through political aspirations (such
as EU membership), by cultural events (such as the Arts Festival in
Nevsehir or the exhibition at the Metropolitan Museum), and through
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“museification” and tourism. Secular activities promote the religious
practice and visibility of Turkish minorities. 
•
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